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ABSTRACT 
Delay in Joint Projects 
by Sebastian Kessing  
If a public project is Þnanced through private contributions with convex costs, 
project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the 
order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. 
All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. 
Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the 
completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of 
strategies is beneÞcial for all. 
 
Keywords: Delay, private provision, public project 
JEL Classification: H41 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten 
Wird ein öffentliche Projekt durch private Beiträge finanziert und sind die 
Kosten dieser Beiträge konvex, so kann die Fertigstellung des Projektes 
verzögert werden. Es wird untersucht, wie Asymmetrien, die Zugfolge der 
beteiligten Akteure und das Fehlen von Bindungsmechanismen die Fertig-
stellungszeit beeinflussen. Diese Faktoren können alle zu Verzögerungen 
führen, jedoch aus sehr unterschiedlichen Gründen. Es zeigt sich, dass ohne 
Bindungsmechanismen die individuellen Beiträge strategische Komplemente 
sind. Dies hat wichtige Implikationen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit von partieller 
Kooperation einer Teilgruppe. 
 
1 Introduction
Delay is an important aspect of many situations in which a public good is
to be provided through private contributions. This was ﬁrst pointed out as
an empirical observation by Olson (1982, p. 39-40) with respect to delayed
formation of organized interest groups. Other salient examples include de-
layed adoption of standards by societies or certain industries (see Farrell and
Saloner, 1988), and the pivotal role played by delay in the political economy
of policy reform as considered by Drazen (2000).
Typically, authors have explained delay in private provision games by
introducing private information. In Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) a public good
is to be provided completely by one individual. Individuals who have private
information about their costs, play a waiting game to see if someone will
come forward to provide the good. Gradstein (1993) retains the assumption
of private information about contribution costs but considers a production
technology where the public good is produced by the number of contributing
individuals with decreasing returns. Both ﬁnd there is ineﬃcient delay if
the number of individuals is ﬁnite. Similarly, in applied contributions such
as Alesina and Drazen (1991), delay is driven by some waiting game which
originates in private information.
However, there seem to be many situations with ineﬃcient delay in which
full information seems to be a valid approximation. Therefore it is worthwhile
studying alternative causes of delay. In this paper I concentrate on the role of
convex contribution costs and their interaction with other potential aspects
of the situation. Convexity of contribution costs is a reasonable assumption
in many settings. Depending on the nature of the contributing unit and
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the form of the contributions, their causes may be, for example, increasing
disutility of labor or decreasing marginal utility of remaining income.
I study the case of a discrete project that has to be completed by means
of private contributions and may be epitomized by the proverbial example
of the building of a bridge by a group of people. Beneﬁts only start ﬂowing
once the bridge is completed. No agent can be excluded from the beneﬁts
of the project and side payments are not allowed. All players have perfect
and complete information. The problem is analyzed in continuous time,
which makes derivations of completion times in equilibrium easier and avoids
equilibria which may only be artefacts of a discrete setting. The model is
solved for the set of symmetric open-loop (OLE) and Markov perfect (MPE)
equilibria.
The convexity of costs usually implies the optimality of project comple-
tion in some positive time. However, in such a setting, individual contribu-
tions may be postponed for two reasons. First, convexity of costs implies
an incentive to spread out contributions in order to decrease marginal costs.
If individual costs and beneﬁts are not perfectly aligned with their social
counterparts, this creates a social ineﬃciency. Second, the dynamic nature
of the situation adds a time dimension to the players’ incentives to free ride
on others’ contributions. The paper analyzes how individual heterogeneity,
order of moves and the absence of commitment devices will aﬀect delay in
such a setting.
The ﬁndings of the model are as follows. In a perfectly symmetric setting
with commitment, a continuum (with respect to completion time) of sym-
metric completing equilibria exists which contains the social optimum as the
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lower bound completion time. This Pareto-dominates all other symmetric
equilibria, so that it is the natural outcome. If commitment is retained but
players are asymmetric or players do not commit to their contribution paths
simultaneously, ineﬃcient delay occurs for distributional reasons. Finally, in
a symmetric setting without commitment, ineﬃcient delay occurs in equilib-
rium. No player can contribute eﬃciently fast, since this will leave him open
to exploitation by the other players later on. Furthermore, unlike the private
provision of a continuously divisible public good, individual contributions are
strategic complements, which make partial harmonization of strategies seem
beneﬁcial and this is important in many policy-related applications. The re-
sults are in line with the observation that, in many real life examples, delay
seems to be closely related to asymmetric players and missing compensation
mechanisms as well as to the lack of commitment devices.
The paper relates to two further strands of literature. First, there is
the connection with the the private provision games of a continuously di-
visible public good in dynamic settings analyzed by Fershtman and Nitzan
(1991), Wirl (1996) and Itaya and Shimomura (2001). This literature ﬁnds
that without commitment the provision level may be either higher or lower,
depending on the set of admissible strategies.
Second, and more importantly, Admati and Perry (1991) and Marx and
Matthews (2000) have considered voluntary contributions to a joint project,
with the key feature of a pay-oﬀ function that is discontinuous at completion
of the project. Marx and Matthews analyze the case where contributors have
linear costs and know both their own and the total sum of contributions, but
cannot observe the individual contributions of other players. With linear
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costs, if the project is carried out in equilibrium, ineﬃciency from delay is
caused only by the time assumed to elapse between the players’ interactions.
Admati and Perry consider the case where two players with convex costs
contribute alternately to a joint project. The MPE derived in section four
can be regarded as a diﬀerential game n-player counterpart of their analy-
sis. While they are concerned with the question of whether socially desirable
projects will be carried out or not, the present analysis focusses on delay
and makes it possible to consider completion times and their comparative
statics explicitly. Furthermore, it allows insights to be made into important
structural properties of the equilibrium, such as strategic complementarity
of individual contributions. This latter property has important implications
for many policy applications. If a subgroup of agents is in the position to
harmonize their strategies, possibly because they interact in other ﬁelds or
are linked through some common institutional arrangements, the comple-
mentarity property implies that such partial cooperation will be beneﬁcial
(Gaudet and Salant, 1991).
The paper is organized as follows. Section two sets up the model and
solves for the social planner’s optimum. In section three the symmetric equi-
libria of the situation with symmetric players and commitment is studied.
Section four discusses how the commitment case changes, when asymmetry
and non-simultaneous moves are considered. Section ﬁve derives the Markov
perfect equilibria of the situation without commitment. Section six con-
cludes.
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2 The Model
A group of n players contributes to a joint project. Individual contributions
xi, i = 1, ..., n, are immediately sunk. Once total contributions reach the
project size K the project is completed and it starts yielding an inﬁnite
continuous stream of beneﬁts Di for individual i. The individual convex cost
functions are, for tractability, assumed to be quadratic, Ci(xi) =
ci
2
x2i . For
now, I consider the case of identical individuals so that for all i, ci = c and
Di = D. Furthermore, parameter values are assumed such that it is not
proﬁtable to carry out the project individually.
The social planner maximizes the representative individual’s intertempo-
ral problem (SWP) given by
max
x(t)
J = −
∫ T
0
c
2
x2e−rtdt +
D
r
e−rT (1)
s.t.
.
k = nx(t) (2)
x(t) ≥ 0 (3)
k(0) = 0 (4)
k(T ) = K. (5)
Alternatively, a project whose size is proportional to the number of users can
be considered. In this case (5) is replaced by k(T ) = nK, and parameters
have to be assumed that, even for n = 1, make it beneﬁcial to carry out the
project. The solution of SWP is summarized in the following
Proposition 1 The socially optimal contribution paths to the project are
given as x∗(t) = λ
∗
c
ert, where λ∗, which is constant over time, denotes the
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costate variable of the social planner’s problem. The optimal completion time
is given by T ∗ = r−1 ln
(
D+ rK
n
√
c
2
D
D− c
2
[Kr]2
n2
)
.
Proof: See appendix.
Naturally, with positive discounting, the optimal policy is to increase
contributions exponentially at rate r until completion, in order to keep the
present value of the marginal cost of an additional unit of contribution un-
changed. Only projects for which D > c
2
[Kr]2
n2
have a positive present value
and should be carried out. If the project size is proportional to the number of
participants, K is replaced by nK in T ∗ and the optimal time is independent
of the number of participants. If the size of the project is ﬁxed, lim
n−>∞
T ∗ = 0,
i.e., the project should be carried out immediately. As the number of con-
tributors becomes very large, the costs can be shared among all of them, and
thus the convexity of individual costs no longer has any bite.
3 The non-cooperative solution with commit-
ment
I consider now the open-loop equilibria of the diﬀerential game, where n
players contemplate their contributions to the joint project individually. In
the open-loop case, the players choose their complete contribution paths
xi(t) at the beginning of the game. Thus, the open-loop assumption implies
that all players are able to commit themselves to their chosen paths over
the entire contribution period. For an extensive discussion of strategy space
and information sets in diﬀerential games see Dockner et al. (2000). A
Nash Equilibrium is given by a vector of n optimal time paths, such that
6
J i(x∗1(t), ..., x
∗
i (t), ..., x
∗
n(t)) ≥ J i(x∗1(t), ..., xi(t), ...x∗n(t)), ∀i. Each individual
i solves the problem (IMP)
max
xi(t)
J i = −
∫ T
0
c
2
x2i e
−rtdt +
D
r
e−rT (6)
s.t.
.
k =
n∑
j=1
xj, (7)
xi ≥ 0, (4) and (5), where the other contributions are taken as given in (7).
The symmetric equilibria are summarized in
Proposition 2 There exists a continuum of symmetric open loop equilib-
ria in which all players commit to contribution paths growing at rate r.
The completion time of these equilibria ranges from T ∗ to
−
T , where
−
T =
r−1 ln
(
D+ rK
n
√
(n− 12)cD
D−(n− 1
2
)c[ rKn ]
2
)
. Additionally, there is a non-completing equilib-
rium, in which no player ever contributes.
Proof: Consider the 2-player case. If player 1 chooses to build half the
project in the eﬃcient time and to contribute zero afterwards, player 2 is left
with the problem of completing a half-size project with half the social beneﬁts
(his own only). Thus, the individual problem is just a scaled down version
of the social problem. The individual costs and beneﬁts are perfectly aligned
with the social ones. Player 2’s best response is to complete the project in
the eﬃcient time. If player one builds her half in any T˜ ∈ [T ∗, T¯ ], it is always
optimal for player two to contribute her half up to that time as well, since
speeding up not only has higher marginal costs for the own given share of
one half, but also necessitates taking over some of player 1’s share. However,
if player one chooses to stretch her share’s contribution beyond T¯ , then it
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pays for player two to take over some of player one’s share. Consequently,
no T > T¯ can be an equilibrium. In the appendix it is shown that the
cut-oﬀ point is indeed given by T¯ . The logic extends straightforwardly to
the n-player case. The non-completing equilibrium follows directly from the
assumption that carrying out the entire project individually is not proﬁtable.
If all players expect the others not to contribute, their best responses are also
not to contribute and the project will not be undertaken.
The eﬃcient equilibrium Pareto-dominates the non-completing and the
other symmetric completing equilibria, so that, with pre-play communica-
tion, reaching the ﬁrst best seems a plausible outcome. Thus, with perfectly
symmetric players and commitment no ineﬃciencies from delay are likely to
occur. Apparently, there are two decisive features that trigger the result.
First, since players can commit not to contribute after T ∗, the other players
have no hope of free-riding on the others’ contributions afterwards. Secondly,
due to symmetry, private and social costs and beneﬁts are perfectly aligned
for one player if all other players choose their equilibrium strategies.
Note that, if the project has a strictly positive net value, further continua
of asymmetric equilibria also exist. For a given non-equal distribution of
project size shares, the completion times of these equilibria are on an interval
[T ′, T ′′], where T ∗ < T ′ and T ′′ < T¯ . The less equal the distribution of project
shares, the smaller [T ′, T ′′], since higher share individuals have an incentive
to delay their contributions, while for lower share individuals taking over
other agents’ burdens is more attractive.
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4 First mover and asymmetry
Let me now consider the robustness of the optimality results under com-
mitment. I will discuss two modiﬁcations to the above setting, where, for
simplicity, I focus on the two-player setting, though the considerations extend
directly to the n-player case.
First, suppose that the game is changed to a Stackelberg setting in the
sense that player 1 gets to choose her contribution path ﬁrst before player
2 chooses hers. As in the static private provision game of a discrete public
good, the Stackelberg leader is in a position to extract some rent from the
follower. In a static setting all rent is extracted from the follower.1 Here,
however, the leader will leave some rent for the follower. The reason is that
the follower has another instrument to react to the leader’s attempt to shift a
bigger share of the project’s size to the follower. This instrument is to delay
contributions in order to smooth marginal costs. This will hurt the leader,
since completion is delayed. Thus the leader faces a trade-oﬀ between shifting
a larger share of the project’s size to the follower and the induced completion
delay. While, for the given model, the situation can no longer be solved out
in closed form, it can be shown that the leader’s proﬁts are increasing in the
follower’s share if her own share is one half. Thus, the leader will always shift
some burden, and this will delay completion. Obviously, this argument only
holds, if the project creates positive proﬁts that can be shifted.
Similarly, if players are asymmetric, either with respect to their cost pa-
1Note, that, if benefits or costs and thus the willingness to contribute, depend on
income levels, such exploitation may be mitigated through a strategic transfer from the
follower to the leader, see Buchholz et al. (1997).
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rameter ci or to their beneﬁts Di, even with commitment the project will not
be completed in the socially optimal time unless side payments are possible.
The reason is that, in such a situation, the individual problem is no longer
a scaled down version of the social problem. People whose marginal cost is
lower will not contribute enough. Similarly, players with lower beneﬁts will
not contribute fast enough.
Again, it is interesting to consider the static counterpart. If players are
suﬃciently asymmetric in the productivity of their contributions, the discrete
public good may not be provided, even though it would be socially desirable.
This may also happen in the dynamic situation, but, typically, there is a
number of projects for which the ineﬃciencies arise from delayed completion.
Thus, both the possibility of committing ﬁrst to a contribution path and
asymmetry among the players will typically cause the optimality result under
commitment to break down. The players’ interests are no longer perfectly
aligned or, in the Stackelberg setting, are even partly opposed. Thus, dis-
tributional reasons prevent the parties from achieving the ﬁrst best solution.
In the Stackelberg case, the outright aim is to exploit the other party, in the
asymmetry case, it is the inability of the less productive, or the party who
proﬁts more to compensate the other through redistribution. In fact, such
asymmetries are present in many real life examples, and in many situations
they constitute an important reason for excessive delay.
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5 The Markov perfect equilibrium
Let me now turn to the situation where no commitment at the beginning
of the game is possible. For this, I consider the Markov perfect equilib-
ria (MPE) of the game as set up in section 3. The strategies of the play-
ers, φ(k, t), are now allowed to depend on time and the evolution of the
state variable k, the progress of the project. Thus, they are rules condi-
tioned on these variables. This implies that, at any instance, players reop-
timize their contributions based on the sum of all contributions made up to
that time, so that these strategies are time consistent. An MPE is given
by a vector of n optimal rules, such that J i(φ∗1(k, t), ..., φ
∗
i (k, t), ..., φ
∗
n(k, t))
≥ J i(φ∗1(k, t), ..., φi(k, t), ...φ∗n(k, t)), ∀i. In fact, since the problem is inde-
pendent of time, the strategies will only depend on the project’s progress,
φ(k). Again, there is a non-completing equilibrium in which no player ever
contributes and a completing equilibrium, which is given in
Proposition 3 (i) The following strategies constitute a symmetric MPE:
φ(k) = 1
c
[β + γk], where β =
2
√
cD(n−1/2)−crK
2n−1 and γ =
cr
(2n−1) .
(ii) The completion time of this MPE is given by TMP =
c
γn
ln
(
1 + γK
β
)
and TMP > T
∗.
Proof: See appendix.
The result shows that, unless it is possible to commit, a strategic incentive
to delay contributions exists. The intuition is straightforward. Although any
one of the players would like to contribute faster, doing so involves a time-
consistency problem. Contributing more heavily early on and then reducing
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or even stopping contributions later is not credible. Later on it is in the
player’s own interest to contribute to completing the project. Since the
other players know this, they would be in a position to exploit the player
who contributed heavily early on by reducing their later contributions. Thus,
in order to prevent the others from free riding each player chooses to delay
her contributions ineﬃciently. If delay is suﬃciently severe, projects cease
to be individually proﬁtable in equilibrium and the completing equilibrium
disappears. Thus, some socially desirable projects will not be carried out.
This parallels the ﬁndings of Admati and Perry (1991), who use a discrete set-
up, in which players alternate their contributions to the project sequentially.
Considering the comparative static properties of the completing MPE
with respect to the number of players reveals that, for the ﬁxed size project,
the cost-sharing eﬀect dominates the free-riding eﬀect. However, considering
the proportional size project, which implies controlling for the cost-sharing
eﬀect, demonstrates that the time-consistency problem is aggravated and
delay increased. Eventually, for all n bigger than some critical value, the
completing equilibrium breaks down.
There are two further interesting aspects of the completing MPE. First,
comparing TMP with the upper bound of the continuum of symmetric open-
loop equilibria, T¯ , shows that TMP < T¯ . Thus, there is a range of equilibria
with commitment that have longer completion times and consequently leave
everybody worse oﬀ. The reason for this can be found in the coordination
problem and the impossibility of reoptimizing under commitment.
Second, since γ > 0, individual contributions are strategic complements.
This contrasts with the ﬁndings of Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) for the
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continuously divisible public good, where they are substitutes. The strategic
complementarity has important consequences for alliance formations in such
settings. Consider a subgroup of agents that can commit to harmonize their
strategies, possibly because they interact in other areas or are linked by some
common institutional arrangement. While agents outside the coalition will
always proﬁt from such harmonization, with strategic complementarity, the
subgroup forming the coalition will typically also increase its welfare (Gaudet
and Salant, 1991). Here, the conjecture is that the harmonization of the own
strategy with a partner weakens the time-consistency problem. Free-riding
within the coalition is prevented through harmonization, free-riding outside
the coalition is reduced due to strategic complementarity. Both eﬀects lead
to faster completion. Thus, partial harmonization leaves everybody better
oﬀ.
Finally, this ﬁnding may be relevant for a class of design problems, in
which some benevolent designer can choose wether the public good to be pro-
vided through private contributions should be discrete or continuous. Since
this choice determines wether individual contributions are complements or
substitutes, it may be beneﬁcial to choose a discrete public good, if commit-
ment devices for some subgroup of agents exist.
6 Conclusion
I have studied a situation in which a public project is provided through pri-
vate contributions with convex costs. A continuum of symmetric completing
equilibria exists with symmetric players and commitment. Since the ﬁrst
13
best solution is among them, this is the natural outcome with potential pre-
play communication. If asymmetric players are allowed for, or if players do
not simultaneously commit to their contribution paths, delay will occur in
equilibrium. Alternatively, the project may not even be carried out at all.
These ineﬃcient equilibria with delay have their origins in distributional con-
cerns, i.e. the ﬁrst mover’s incentive to exploit the followers and the missing
compensation mechanisms in the case of asymmetric costs and beneﬁts. The
results parallel the static provision game of a discrete public good to some ex-
tent. However the dichotomy provision versus non-provision is complemented
by the delay dimension’s ineﬃciency. The possibility of stretching out contri-
butions to reduce costs eases some of the strong distributional implications
of some of the static equilibria.
A time consistency problem arises if agents cannot commit to a con-
tribution path. This causes all agents to delay their contributions so that
ineﬃciently late completion of the project results. If an agent contributes
eﬃciently fast early on, she is open to exploitation through the others later
on. These others can reduce their late contributions, knowing that the com-
pletion of the project is also in the interest of the early heavy contributor,
who will end up contributing relatively heavily later on as well. Delay rel-
ative to eﬃcient completion increases in the number of agents if the size of
the project is proportional, since the dynamic free riding incentive becomes
stronger. Surprisingly, there is a range of symmetric commitment equilib-
ria whose completion times are longer than without commitment. Finally,
individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing MPE.
This justiﬁes the conjecture that a subgroup of agents who form a coalition
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by harmonizing their contribution decisions reduces ineﬃcient delay and will
leave everybody better oﬀ.
The results are valid in many microeconomic settings, such as the joint
development of some non-patentable innovation by a group of ﬁrms, the writ-
ing of a joint paper by a group of scientists, or the attempt of a group of
lobbyists to change a legislator’s opinion. They also have straightforward
policy implications for macroeconomic issues. Consider the examples of pol-
icy reform or stabilizations. The successful completion of such projects often
necessitates contributions, such as wage restraints or reduced ﬁscal spending
from various parties over a prolonged period of time. For these measures to
be successful, it is often important that combined contributions of the actors
involved reach a threshold value, say to qualify for support from the IMF or
to regain the conﬁdence of ﬁnancial markets.2 The groups involved often face
convex contribution costs originating from ﬁnancial market imperfections or
tax smoothing arguments. Then the present model directly allows observed
delay or even failure to be traced to cost and beneﬁt asymmetries with miss-
ing compensation mechanisms, non-simultaneous moves and the absence of
commitment devices. Furthermore, the results indicate that, if some parties
involved, such as a group of sectorial unions in the case of a wage restraint,
or regional governments in the case of reducing ﬁscal spending, can commit
2The discrete nature of the project often arises from some institutionally set threshold
values. A typical example is the 3% budget deficit level specified in the European stability
pact. An EMU member country faces sanctions if the sum of all public sector deficits
exceeds this level. Thus, above this level, within each member state a private provision
game unfolds between various financially autonomous entities such as regional and central
governments.
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to harmonize their strategies, they will proﬁt from harmonizing and earlier
and successful completion is more likely to result.
7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: The Hamiltonian of the SWP is given as
H = −e−rt c
2
[x(t)]2 + λ∗(t)x(t). (8)
Consequently, the necessary conditions are then given by
∂H
∂x
= −e−rtcx(t) + λ∗(t) = 0 (9)
.
λ∗ = −∂H
∂k
= 0 => λ∗(t) = const (10)
[H]t=T +
∂
[
D
r
e−rT
]
∂T
= 0 (11)
The optimal individual contribution path follows directly from (9). Solving
the system of (9), (10) and (11) by making use of the initial and terminal con-
ditions (4) and (5) delivers the resulting completion time given in proposition
1.
Proof of proposition 2: For the proof it is helpful ﬁrst to establish a
lemma which establishes the fact that under commitment individual actions
can be perfectly summarized by the individual’s planned project share and
the planned termination time.
Lemma 1 For a given total project share a player plans to contribute, her
strategy is perfectly characterized by the terminal time chosen. The contri-
butions will start in t=0 and grow exponentially at rate r until the chosen
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termination time is reached, i.e. xt =
λ
c
ert ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] and xt = 0 ∀ t > T .
The value of λ depends on project share δ and the planned T in the following
way: δK =
∫ T
0
λ
c
ertdt.
Proof: The exponential contribution path follows directly from cost min-
imization. The present value of an additional marginal contribution should
be kept constant. The relationship between δK, T and λ satisﬁes that the
project share is actually reached in the planned time.
These general properties of the players’ contibution paths can now be
used to prove proposition 2. For simplicity, I normalize the project size to
one and demonstrate, for the two player, case that T¯ is indeed the cut-oﬀ
value above which it pays to take over some of the other players’ share, but
below which it does not. Suppose that player two chooses a project share of
one half and some T2 > T¯ . In this case it is never a best response for player 1
to choose the same completion time but some completion time smaller than
T2. To see this, consider the change in the net present value of costs and
beneﬁts that result from reducing completion time. The NPV of player 1’s
costs is
NC1(T1) =
∫ T1
0
c
2
(
λ′
c
ert
)2
e−rtdt, (12)
where the value of λ′ has to be derived from the increased overall burden by
taking over part of player two’s contribution. If player 1 expects player 2 to
choose T2 > T¯ , then, by lemma 1, he also expects an exponential contribution
path for player 2 fulﬁlling 1
2
=
∫ T2
0
λ2
c
ertdt. This gives λ2 =
rc
2[erT2−1] , so that
player two’s cumulated contribution evolves according to
.
k2(t) =
r
2[erT2−1]e
rt,
which can be solved as k2(t) =
[ert−1]
2[erT2−1] . Therefore player 1 concludes for
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himself that, if he chooses to complete at some T1 < T2, the completion
constraint will read
1
2
+
(
1
2
−
[
erT1 − 1]
2 [erT2 − 1]
)
=
∫ T1
0
λ′
c
ertdt (13)
1
2
+
(
1
2
−
[
erT1 − 1]
2 [erT2 − 1]
)
=
λ′
rc
[
erT1 − 1]
rc
(
1− [e
rT1−1]
2[erT2−1]
)
[erT1 − 1] = λ
′
rc
(
1
[erT1 − 1] −
1
2 [erT2 − 1]
)
= λ′
Substituting into the cost function and solving the integral gives
NC1(T1) =
cr
2
[
1
(erT1 − 1) −
1
[erT2 − 1] +
[
erT1 − 1]
4 [erT2 − 1]2
]
. (14)
Then, the change in costs is given as
∂NC1(T1)
∂T1
=
cr
2
rerT1
(
1
4 [erT2 − 1]2 −
1
(erT1 − 1)2
)
(15)
The change in the NPV of the returns is given by ∂
∂T1
[D
r
e−rT1 ] = −De−rT1 .
Evaluating these expressions at T1 = T2 a condition is derived for when it is
better to choose some smaller T1 :
De−rT2 >
cr
2
rerT2
(
− 1
4 [erT2 − 1]2 +
1
(erT2 − 1)2
)
(16)
This holds as an equality precisely at T2 = T¯ , so that it pays to take over
some share, if T2 > T¯ , and to choose the same time, T1 = T2, if T
∗ ≤ T2 <
−
T .
The same reasoning can be applied in the general n-player case to derive T¯
as given in proposition 2.
18
Proof of proposition 3: (i) First note that IMP can be rewritten as
max
xi
J =
D
r
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
[ c
2
x2i + D
]
dt (17)
s.t. the given constraints. To solve for the MPE, neglecting the constant
term, consider the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of player i
−Vt(t, k) + rV (t, k) = max
φi
[
− c
2
φ2i −D + Vk
(
φi +
∑
j =i
φj
)]
. (18)
Observe that the problem at hand is completely time independent, in the
sense that only the number of players and the missing contributions to com-
pletion matter for the current value of the project to the individual. Thus,
Vt(t, k) = 0. Furthermore, the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization
problem on the right hand side is given as φi =
Vk
c
. Resubstituting gives
rV (t, k) = − c
2
(
Vk
c
)2
−D + Vk
(
Vk
c
+
∑
j =i
φj
)
, (19)
and assuming symmetry
rV (t, k) = (n− 1
2
)
V 2k
c
−D. (20)
This non-linear diﬀerential equation can be solved as follows. The quadratic
nature of the problem leads to the conjecture that the value function itself
may be quadratic, V (k) = α + βk + 1
2
γk2. Substituting this into the above
gives
rα + rβk +
1
2
rγk2 =
n− 1
2
c
(
β2 + 2βγk + γ2k2
)−D (21)
This can only hold, if the following three equations hold
1
2
rγ − n−
1
2
c
γ2 = 0 (22)
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rβ − n−
1
2
c
2βγ = 0 (23)
rα− n−
1
2
c
β2 + D = 0 (24)
From (22) it must be that either γ = 0 or γ = cr
2(n−1/2) . If γ = 0, β = 0 and
consequently α = −D/r. This corresponds to the non-completing perfect
Markov equilibrium, in which no one ever contributes. If γ = cr
2(n−1/2) ,
(23) always holds for any β. Now we can use the boundary condition α +
βK + 1
2
γK2 = 0, such that α = −βK − 1
2
cr
2(n−1/2)K
2. Substituting into
(24) and solving the resulting quadratic equation gives β =
2
√
cD(n−1/2−crK
2(n−1/2)
as the positive solution. Consequently, the project’s parameter must fulﬁll
2
√
cD(n− 1/2 ≥ crK for the completing equilibrium to exist.
Now consider the corresponding evolution of k :
.
k =
n
c
[γk(t) + β] . (25)
This can be solved as
k(t) = −β
γ
+ Ze
γn
c
t (26)
where Z is a constant that can be determined by the initial condition k(0) =
0, such that Z = β
γ
. Resubstituting delivers the progress of the project as a
function of time k(t) = −β
γ
+ β
γ
e
γn
c
t. Setting k(t) = K this can be solved for
completion time T :
TMP =
c
γn
ln
(
1 +
Kγ
β
)
.
(ii) Without loss of generality normalize the beneﬁts, D = 1. Then the claim
TMP > T
∗.becomes
2n− 1
rn
ln
[
2
√
c(n− 1/2)
2
√
c(n− 1/2)− crK
]
>
1
r
ln
[
1 + rK
n
√
c/2
1− c
2
r2K2
n2
]
(27)
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<=>
[
2
√
c(n− 1/2)
2
√
c(n− 1/2)− crK
] 2n−1
n
>
[
1 + rK
n
√
c/2
1− c
2
r2K2
n2
]
<=>

 1
1− crK
2
√
c(n−1/2)


2n−1
n
>
[
1
1− rK
n
√
c
2
]
.
This will always be true, if
crK
2
√
c(n− 1/2) >
rK
n
√
c
2
<=> n >
√
2(n− 1/2),
which holds for all n ≥ 2.
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